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This study will utilize an OLS analysis of the panel data coming from various databases 
such as the World Bank, Federal Reserve and etc. to determine if there exists a significant 
correlation between the exports of Japan and its foreign direct investment (FDI) in the period of 
1985-2005 with nearby trading partners of which include the countries of ASEAN, China and 
South Korea.  In addition, a selection of supplemental factors will be used to determine if they 
also possess any significance with exports.  These factors include: the exchange rate of the 
Japanese yen with the currency of the trading partner in relation to the US Dollar, the magnitude 
of trade between Japan and the trading partner (YA * YB), and GDP growth.  The signing of the 
Plaza Accord in 1985 caused the appreciation of the Japanese yen that inflated the economy to a 
substantial growth period that rivalled post-war revival.  Japan’s transition to becoming the 
leading economy in East Asia enabled itself to become a provider of capital by initiating  
outward FDI in less developed countries to penetrate into those foreign markets.  This study 
analyzes Japan’s trade relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
South Korea, Taiwan and China by testing empirically how Japan’s FDI in those host countries 
spur its export growth in those countries.  Japan pursued an export-led growth strategy in its 
economic development in the post-World War II period, which led to an insurmountable trade 
surplus from 1960 to the mid 1980’s.  Applying trade theories such as the border effect and the 
gravity model, this study will evaluate what prompted Japan’s export growth in those host 
countries in the region after currency appreciation under the Plaza Accord.  This paper proposes 
that Japan’s exports are indeed significantly correlated with FDI, relative exchange rate, trade 
intensity and GDP growth.  It is concluded that Japan’s outward FDI contributes to its export 
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Japan, though as the third largest economy in the world, is a resource scarce nation, has 
to import quite a few resources from abroad to produce for goods and services.  To pay for its 
import bills, Japan has to compensate its domestic market by expanding its export which will 
generate a scale economy to compete with those products from other OECD countries.  Japan 
isn’t land abundant such as some of its neighbors on the Asian continent and therefore does not 
have an adequate supply of raw material to produce goods.  Japan has had to rely on factor 
substitution and imports of energy and raw materials for its economy.  Large investments in 
capital offset the lack of land and labor that would be required to yield a considerable output for 
a growing economy.  History shows that Japan’s post war economic revival through super export 
growth was of an exemplary one.  Japan’s economic revival may be attributed to “American 
foreign policy during the cold war, the threat of Communist China’s aggressiveness in East and 
South China Seas, and the fostering of economic interdependence between Japan and the United 
States under which the United States engaged in a liberal trade policy to promote Japanese 
economic welfare (Kolb, 2000, p. 5).  Its economy had recovered from the devastation of the war 
and after decades of super economic growth, found itself as an upcoming economic power 
towards the end of the 20th century.  Being recognized as a major economic power in the 1980’s, 
Japan’s economy was challenged by other world powers in the form of the Plaza Accord.  Most 
of the world powers had trade deficits, especially the USA, with Japan having a substantial trade 
surplus.  According to the Los Angeles Times, “Japan accounted for roughly one-third of the 
overall deficit” of the US total trade deficit in 1985 (Los Angeles Times, 1986).  It became clear 
that imports from Japan was largely contributing to the growing US trade deficit in that period.  




US Dollar in order to make it more affordable for other nations to buy American goods to 
enhance its exports and correcting the trade imbalance (Twomey 2018, Investopedia, P.X.).  
With pressure under the US in order to reduce Japan’s trade surplus against the US, the Plaza 
Accord was signed by the G-5,i.e. US, Japan, Germany, UK and France.  The Plaza Accord of 
1985 was designed to realign the exchange rates between the US Dollar and other major 
currencies including the Japanese yen by allowing the US Dollar to depreciate (Twomey 2018, 
Investopedia, P.X.). This self-inflicting strategy by the US was intended to reduce US trade 
deficits and create more jobs for Americans.  In a statement put out by members of the Plaza 
Accord meeting, “some further orderly appreciation of the non-dollar currencies is desirable,” 
displayed the intent of the Accord which resulted in a 10-12% depreciation of the US Dollar 
relative to the Japanese yen and Deutsche Mark (Funabashi 1988, pg. 16-21). 
The Reagan Administration (1981-1989), at the time of signing the Plaza Accord, had cut 
the tax which generated a sizable budget deficit resulting in an oversaturated trade deficit.  This 
created a surge of additional budget allocations into the Defense sector.  Government 
expenditure also soared during this time as the US prepared to end the Cold War.  Dubbed 
“Reaganomics”, President Reagan initiated such measures which drastically increased the US 






Figure 1: US Dollar Index  Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TWEXBPA    
 
Figure 1 shows US Dollar’s performance before and after Plaza Accord was signed.  As a 
result of the Plaza Accord, the US Dollar took a backseat to other world currencies, more notably 
the Japanese yen.  In terms of currency realignment, the Plaza Accord had a profound effect on 
the Japanese yen in relation to the US Dollar.  According to the above graph, the US Dollar took 
a fall after the signing of the Accord, resulting in a stronger yen in comparison to the US Dollar.  
As the US Dollar’s presence regressed, the US trade deficit was cut and became more balanced, 








Y-axis: % of GDP 
 
Figure 2: Long Term Development of the U.S. Trade Balance Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
https://www.statista.com/chart/9728/us-trade-balance/ 
 
As seen in Figure 2, the US trade deficit was very much negative in the 1980’s.  This 
became the motive for the signing of the Plaza Accord.  Evidently, the trade deficit was indeed 
cut by the 1990’s which fulfilled the overall purpose of the Accord, from a US perspective.  
The Japanese economy, in turn, soared to new heights after the Plaza Accord.  The appreciation 
of the yen stimulated the economy into achieving a higher real GDP.  At such a time, all aspects 
of the Japanese economy such as exports and government expenditure experienced growth in 






Figure 3: Nominal GDP of Japan      Source: IMF, 2001 
 
The growth of Japan’s economy in the late 1980’s led the nation into the direction of a 
highly developed economy with sophisticated high-tech industries.  Exports had long been a 
surplus measure.  According to the World Integrated Trade Solution, Japan had a positive trade 
balance of $60.32 billion in Q4 1988 (WITS).  Japan’s highest exported goods were automobiles 
and electronics, while their largest imported goods were crude oil commodities (WITS, 1988).  
In comparison with its economy of the 1960-80, Japan exported a great deal of high-tech exports 
after the 1980’s.  This meant that Japan turned its head to the future and began production of 
electronic and biomechanical products.  Nevertheless, Shujiro Urata and Hirohisa Kohama 
explain that Japan’s willingness to modernize, with an already appreciated currency, plagued the 
country into structural unemployment (Urata and Kohama 1988, pg. 323).   
In 1987, Japan had an unemployment rate of 3%, which is a healthy figure of a grown economy 
(Urata and Kohama 1988, pg. 323).  This incredible rise of the tech industry hastened the speed 




of exports leaving the country of Japan, contributed to the vast appreciation of the yen.  
According to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the Japanese Yen held the high 
exchange rate of 121.30 USDJPY on December 5, 1988 (BIS).  Due to the currency appreciation, 
the Japanese yen was too strong for the public to acquire and pay for goods that had experienced 
inflation.   
 
Figure 4: Consumer Price Index (CPI) of Japan     Source: FRED 
 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) of Japan indicates a hike of all prices post-1985 
(FRED).  Goods and commodities became too expensive to afford for foreign consumers.  The 
appreciation of the yen did little to help with the affordability of a foreign country’s willingness 
to buy Japanese goods.  Due to a higher value of currency, foreign countries could not afford to 
buy Japanese goods.  The yen was too strong for any country to purchase goods coming out of 








Country 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Brunei 0 0 0 0 
China 119.08 83.96 88.74 89.2 
Japan 101.75 yen 114.03 yen 114.98 yen 106.1 yen 
Cambodia 0 103.45 98.2 92.43 
Korea, Rep. 0 106.67 130.81 111.1 
Lao PDR 0 98.6 92.87 92.25 
Myanmar 0 78.64 117.8 108.55 
Malaysia 135.77 118.13 107.6  96.57 
Philippines 94.74 97.94 102.97 82.26 
Singapore 90.17 97.38 102.62 93.91 
Thailand 0 107.81 99.35 86.04 
Vietnam 0 76.16 89.52 88.86 
Taiwan 31.91 26.37 29.81 33.25  
Table A: Real Effective Exchange Rates (in respective currency, i.e. Japan = yen), given in 5-
year averages  Based period = 2010     Source: IMF Data 
 
Table A shows the real effective exchange rate of each trading country including Japan 
according to 2010 prices (2010=100).  It can be seen that Japan witnessed a spike in their real 
exchange rate after 1985.  An appreciated yen would entail a stronger Japanese economy as a 




of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis which devastated much of the east Asian economies.  As 
evidence shows, the Plaza Accord indeed fulfilled its promise of reducing trade deficits and 




Figure 5: Real Effective Exchange Rate of Japan     Source: CEIC 
 
The real exchange rate in Japan experienced its peak in the mid 1990’s as a result of this 
economic expansion which made the yen one of the strongest currencies in the world.  A yen that 
had peaked in value in relation to the US Dollar, may have consequences for the aggregate 
economy.  It would mean that an appreciated yen would translate to a decreased demand of 
Japanese exports amongst the international community, which may result in Japanese firms 
having to cut down on employment to make up for the lack of product demand.  In this case, 
unemployment would increase and make it harder for the population to acquire any domestic 




GDP per capita in Japan reached a peak in 1995 at $43,440 but rapidly fell to $31,902 in 1998 
(World Bank).  This higher real exchange rate means that import goods from abroad is relatively 
cheaper and more affordable for Japanese consumer than what were before the Plaza Accord. 
The Japanese people had to turn to imported goods to satisfy their demand for consumer goods.   
 
Country 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Brunei 0 0 0 0 
China 178.44 111.81 86.94 92.71 
Japan 45.16 yen 68.77 yen 83.77 yen 87.54 yen 
Cambodia 0 0 0 0 
Korea, Rep. 0 155.31 134.82 107.41 
Lao PDR 0 98.6 92.87 92.25 
Myanmar 0 78.64 117.8 108.55 
Malaysia 124.42 119.9 111.37 98.05 
Philippines 200.79 164.38 150.82 101.96 
Singapore 69.82 81.11 91.48 90.18 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan 39.85 26.47 31.15 33.39 
Table B: Nominal Exchange Rates, (in respective currency, i.e. Japan = yen), given in 5-year 





The US Dollar depreciated from the real exchange rate of $270USD/JPY to 
$103USD/JPY in the year following 1985 (World Bank, 1985).  According to Tables A and B, 
Japan experienced a substantial increase in both real and nominal exchange rates in relation to 
the US Dollar.  This appreciation of the currency plays an important role in this thesis as it 
represents an acceleration of outward FDI flows.  The appreciation of the yen proceeded the two 
lost decades of the Heisei Recession in Japan.  Hence it becomes the main thesis of this study to 
show to what extent Japan’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) had helped Japan to 
mitigate its economic slowdown in the lost decades.  Through an appreciated yen, a correlation 
may be seen between the real exchange of Japan and its exports.  “The results indicate that there 
is a statistically significant relationship between exports of goods, rest of world income and the 
real exchange rate” indicates the importance of the exchange rate in regard to exports (Chinn 
2013, pg. 1).  
Country 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
China $12,223 $18,821 $53,670 $99,461 
Taiwan $4,110 $4,915 $9,063 $12,278 
Korea, Rep. $4,657 $6,705 $13,428 $28,127 
Singapore $9,887 $11,283 $22,363 $40,360 
Thailand $7,115 $9,412 $23,476 $45,664 
Indonesia $8,447 $6,502 $10,259 $21,557 
Malaysia $4,473 $4,810 $8,815 $12,966 
Philippines $2,243 $3,211 $7,489 $11,428 
Vietnam 0 0 $3,848 $10,870 
Total: 
World $271,663 $358,666 $701,487 $1,152,103 
Table C: Outward FDI stock going into partner nations in US $millions (given in 5 year 
averages), Based period = 2010, Source: JETRO, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan, 2018 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has played a role in the performance of the Japanese 
economy in relevance to the global economy.  As the Japanese economy and currency boomed, 
due to the Plaza Accord, a degree of internalization was setting in.  There existed a need to invest 
 
1. ASEAN members include: Indonesia, Brunei, Lao PDR, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, The Philippines, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand. Other countries included in this study: South Korea, Taiwan and China 
Ladas 14 
and export goods into the region to prevent a domestic overload of goods produced.  
Buyers of such goods were wanted but due to the much advanced economy of Japan in relation 
to ASEAN partners, it was almost impossible for the small economies of ASEAN to purchase 
Japanese goods.  By investing in these countries, Japan could develop these small markets into 
economies that were able to acquire Japanese goods.   
The appreciation of the yen and the substantial growth of Japan’s economy post-Plaza 
Accord gave the country the ability to invest in foreign countries.  Being an island economy, 
Japan felt that it was necessary to initiate FDI in East and South East Asia, establishing an 
efficiency in delivering FDI stock to East Asian affiliates.  Most notably, Japan was able to 
invest with large intergovernmental associations such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)1.  Japan’s initiation of outward FDI stock into partner countries such as ASEAN 
displays the economic prominence Japan wished to achieve in the region1.  FDI opens up a 
multitude of opportunities any economy willing to partake in it.  “Especially for the least 
developed countries, FDI means higher exports, access to international markets and international 
currencies, being an important source of financing, substituting bank loans”, highlights the 
importance of FDI in countries that seek an economic takeoff (Denisia 2010, pg. 53).  In Japan’s 





Country 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Thailand 10.40% 8.70% 2.07% 5.30% 
Philippines 4.74% 2.33% 3.77% 4.57% 
Indonesia 6.26% 7.15% 2.22% 4.76% 
Malaysia 6.89% 9.40% 5.80% 5.40% 
Singapore 8.70% 8.90% 5.94% 5.61% 
Vietnam 4.80% 7.69% 7.39% 6.88% 
Cambodia 0 -12.45% 7.60% 9.50% 
Myanmar -1.98% 5.38% 8.27% 13.02% 
Brunei 0.08% 2.82% 1.87% 2.21% 
Lao PDR 4.47% 6.28% 6.32% 6.17% 
Korea, 
Rep. 10.50% 8.66% 6.31% 5.44% 
Taiwan 4.80% 6.96% 6.01% 4.45% 
China 8.90% 10.88%% 9.02% 9.58% 
Japan 4.97%% 2.06% 1.39% 1.45% 
Table D: GDP growth rates (as % of country B’s GDP) Based period = 2010,              
Source: World Bank data 
Table D displays the GDP growth of these nations shows the gradual increase of each 
economy’s GDP.  A growing economy, being influenced by Japan’s FDI stock, would entitle 
Japan to premier rights to such a budding economy.  “From a macroeconomic point of view, FDI 
is a particular form of capital flows across borders, from countries of origin to host 
countries…the variable of interest is: capital flows and stocks, revenues obtained from 
investments,” indicate further advantages of Japan’s willingness to initiate FDI in foreign 
countries (Denisia 2010, pg. 54).   
Previous models done on the Japanese economy have focused on other variables such as 
consumption, money supply and trade.  For example, Lee et. Al’s paper was conducted with a 
model based on consumption levels (Lee et. Al, 2003, pg. 1).  Simone Auer’s model utilizes 
foreign investment income and the monetary aspects of a large Bayesian vector autoregression 




exports (Chinn, 2013, pg. 7).  This model will focus on the rate of outward FDI stock coming out 
of country A (Japan) into country B.  Since the case country is Japan in this study, this model will 
analyze the FDI stock leaving Japan and going into nearby ASEAN countries as well as South 
Korea, Taiwan and China. 
This study is being done to analyze how Japan’s exports were affected by its outward 
FDI flows.  A regression model will be created to test the significance of the FDI variable on 
export growth after adding those controlled variables in the regression model.  Japan’s FDI was 
primarily focused on its closest neighbors, in this case ASEAN countries, Taiwan, China and 
South Korea.  This study would like to begin in 1985, a reasonable time period from the Lost 
Decade era of the 1990’s, as a starting point for the thesis.  It will conclude in the year of 2005, 
which would translate to the study spanning across two decades. Another reason as to why this 
thesis would like to start its study from the year 1985 would be that of the Plaza Accord.  The 
Plaza Accord was signed in 1985 and created an appreciation of the Japanese yen.  Relative 
exchange rates of the yen will be figured out between Japan and all host countries by using the 
exchange rates between the yen and the currencies of the host countries in relation to the US 
Dollar.  For such a reason, 1985 would be a sensible platform to begin the study.  This study is 
expected to find out whether that outward FDI stock affects Japan’s exports in a way through 
means of panel data regression and analysis. 
This study will conclude in 2005 due to the incredible rise of China’s economy, where it 
began to best Japan’s economy in such a year.  Japan was previously thought to be the most 
significant and important market in Asia before 2005.  China’s unprecedented rise to economic 
powerhouse was spurred by its government’s policy to seek global leadership. And desire to 




exports.  An economic report written by Dr. Axel Berkofsky in 2005 states, “…a slowdown of 
exports had an immediate impact on Japan’s economic growth figures.” (Berkofsky 2005, pg.4)  
Further doubts on Japan’s economy were raised in the following report, “Recent (January 2005 
onwards) news about negative economic growth over three-quarters of a year in 2004 has 
confirmed pessimistic analysts’ view that Japan’s economic recovery is still far from 
sustainable.” (Berkofsky 2005, pg.4)  Economic forecasts leaned in favor of China even 
surpassing the USA in the near future.   
 
Figure 6: China vs Japan (GDP comparison)    Source: IMF Data 
 
Figure 6 shows the convergence of the Chinese and Japan economies.  Japan had been the 
largest economy in East Asia.  Looking at year 1985, an uptick of Japan’s GDP (blue line) can be 
seen as a result of the Plaza Accord.  The Chinese economy progressively increased in size while 
Japan remained stagnant in the 2000’s.  The late end of the 2000’s decade shows the point at 
which China usurped Japan as the largest economy in East Asia.  For such reason, this thesis 




II. Review of Literature: 
This thesis has gathered quite a few sources of literature dealing with the time series data 
of Japan’s economy.  By giving such a wide explanation for the economic history of Japan, the 
structure of this thesis can look forward to linking the main body of the thesis to a conclusion 
that can be used as an exit type of strategy when closing the argument of the thesis.   
A source that was chosen is a study titled “Reviving Japan’s Economy: A Suggestion for 
a Consumption-Driven Policy” by Ho-Chul Lee, Shahid Yusuf and Akifumi Kuchiki (Lee et. Al, 
2003).  This paper defines the relationship that monetary policy had on the Japanese economy 
(Lee, et. Al 2003).  “A relatively strong yen, weak international demand, competition in the 
export markets with products from Korea and Taiwan, and penetration by Chinese manufactures 
sharply reduced Japan’s trade surplus in 2000-2001”, describes the export situation Japan was 
dealing with (Lee, et. Al 2003, pg. 9).  It came to a turning point when Japan realized that a high 
exchange rate wasn’t all that great.  The yen had appreciated to such a great extent that it became 
too expensive for foreign consumers to acquire or trade for such a currency.  In other words, the 
yen was appreciated higher and higher in the currency transactions in the foreign exchanges 
market.  Economies that had benefitted from Japan’s FDI outflows, progressed to rival Japan’s 
ability to export.  This can also be attributed to Japan’s investment going into these countries.  
Years of investment had developed these economies into markets that gained the ability to 
produce and export their own goods.  “Although exports comprise less than 12 percent of the 
GDP, the government [of Japan], having failed to stimulate demand by means of other policies, 
began attempting in December 2001 to raise exports through a depreciation of the yen parity,” 




intention was hinged upon the possibility that a depreciated yen “could potentially boost demand 
through higher exports…” (Lee et. Al 2003, pg. 9).   
According to Simone Auer in her paper “Monetary Policy Shocks and Foreign 
Investment Income: Evidence from a Large Bayesian VAR”, “the results of foreign investment 
income flows show that monetary policy shocks have a statistically and economically significant 
impact on…net foreign investment income flows on both countries.” (Auer 2014, pg. 18).  This 
study wanted to add the effect that monetary policy had on FDI due to the fact that the Japanese 
government consequently initiated substantial monetary policy in order stem the effect of the 
recession.  This study will not be about the recession, but due to an analysis of FDI stock in 
between the years of 1985 and 2005, it would make sense to include monetary policy as a means 
of dealing with an economic shock.  Going back to Lee, et. Al, the paper introduces information 
that implies a “low price elasticity for Japan’s exports” (Lee et. Al, 2003, pg. 10).  Having found 
a literature piece on the price elasticity of Japan’s exports, in the paper “Export and Import 
Elasticities for Japan: New Estimates” by Menzie D. Chinn, it examines the relationship between 
the real exchange rate and exports of Japan (Chinn, 2013).  This is relevant to the study because 
one of the independent variables that will be tested is the relative exchange rate between the yen 
and respective currencies in the those FDI recipient countries in relation to the US Dollar.  This 
will also help explain the effect of the Plaza Accord onto the Japanese economy.  By being a 
control variable in the model, it can have a direct influence on the dependent variable, which is 
the export variable.  
In Fukuhara Kimura’s paper, titled “Exports, FDI and Productivity: Dynamic Evidence 
from Japanese firms”, he argues that “the most productive firms engage in FDI” (Kimura, 2006, 




higher degree of productivity than those that are domestic (Kimura, 2006, pg. 14).  Kimura 
presents two questions in relation to how effective FDI is to the exports of an economy: “Do 
good firms get involved in FDI or does FDI boost a firm’s productivity or even both?” (Kimura, 
2006, pg. 4) This thesis will revolve around the relationship between FDI and exports.  In other 
words, it does a greater amount of FDI leading to increased productivity of a firm in its exports 
and ability to produce goods.  Kimura uses a panel data set. The data sets are in the form of 
Excel spreadsheets. 
 In Kimura’s panel data study, he found that there is a close correlation between FDI and 
exports.  Firms that initiate FDI by investing and building in foreign countries produce larger 
amounts of exports.  Productivity has shown that it is derived from an expansion of FDI that 
leads to higher exports.  Investing in different sectors of the world economy has shown that it can 
be greatly beneficial to a firm.  It tempts a firm to work harder when farther from home and 
increase production in comparison to a domestic firm.   
 It must be said that, according to Kimura’s study, firms that engage in exports do not 
always engage in FDI (Kimura 2006).  In fact, firms that do both are “in the minority” (Kimura, 
2006, pg. 6).  However, these firms do have larger productivity rates due to their ability and 
willingness to invest in the foreign sector.  This may lead to the conclusion that Japan’s exports 
are affected by the outward FDI stock being invested in a partner country. 
 Shujiro Urata writes “FDI has significant impacts on economic activities, because it 
transfers not only financial resources, but also technology and managerial know-how from 
investing countries, or the home countries, to the recipient countries, or the host 
countries.”(Urata 2004, pg. 22)  As said in the quote, Urata describes the effects that FDI has on
 
2. Asian Tiger economies: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea 
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 an economy and the advantages of engaging in such (Urata 2004, pg.22).  Human capital works 
in tandem with capital to produce a greater outcome. 
Japan’s unfortunate experience with two recessions in a span of a decade has had a 
profound impact on its GDP as well as the export component belonging to it.  Its first recession 
(1991-1992) dubbed the “Lost Decade”, was a result of a bubble economy that burst when it 
could not be properly sustained.  The second (1997-1999) was the region wide collapse of the 
Four Asian tiger economies2 in 1997.  Both impacted Japan’s export as seen in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Japan’s trade balance     Source: Thomson Reuters 
Japan experienced a significant decrease of exports in the years of these recessions.  
According to Figure 7, Japan went through an unstable amount of exports that idled between 




economic shocks, such as recessions, has a significant effect on the amount of exports produced 
by Japan.  Even more relevant to this thesis, are the ripple effects of a recession onto other 
countries.  Table E, in regard to GDP growth, depicts a slowing down of the major economies 
during the recession period of 1995-2000.  With a weaker economy, major trading partners could 
not afford to buy Japanese goods, which harmed Japan’s exports.  As these major buyers of 
Japan’s exports dwindled, Japan’s FDI stock in these countries could not produce effective 
returns for such large investments.   “Japan’s overseas investments were initially (i.e., in the late 
1950s and the 1960s) aimed mostly at exploiting natural resources in resource-rich countries or 
manufacturing labor-intensive products in labor-abundant developing countries,” pinpoint 
Japan’s strategy of choosing a candidate for an FDI opportunity (Ozawa 2007, pg. 4). 
 
Country 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Singapore 3.41% 4.39% 4.52% 3.47% 
Thailand 2.54% 3.46% 3.38% 3.28% 
Philippines 0.80% 1.20% 1.97% 1.89% 
Malaysia 1.53% 2.72% 3.16% 2.50% 
Indonesia 1.37% 1.84% 1.59% 1.55% 
Myanmar 0.05% 0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 
Vietnam 0.07% 0.14% 0.32% 0.51% 
Brunei 0.22% 0.04% 0.02% 3.00% 
Laos 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 
South Korea 5.98% 6.03% 6.04% 7.10% 
Taiwan 5.51% 5.36% 6.69% 8.08% 
China 3.36% 3.80% 5.43% 10.38% 
Total: 24.84% 29.06% 33.19% 41.80% 
Table E: Japan’s exports to country B, as % of GDP of country B  (given in 5-year averages)  





Table E shows the amount of exports Japan sells to each country B as a percentage of 
country B’s GDP. Strictly speaking, the ratio should be Japan’s export to country B as 
percentage of Japan’s GDP to show its significance for Japan.  It can be seen that China grew to 
become one of the largest destinations for Japanese exports.  This can be attributed to China’s 
incredible GDP growth toward the 2000-2005 period.  China was also the recipient for a very 
large amount of FDI stock from Japan.  
Looking at Table E of Japanese exports going into these partner countries, it can be seen 
which countries are of more significance to the Japanese economy, in terms of exports.  South 
Korea and Taiwan maintain strong import levels coming from Japan and are therefore a very 
intensive trade partner with Japan.  China has also put up great numbers, especially in the years 
of 2000-2005, where they escalated their imports of Japanese products in exemplary numbers.  
This shows that China is a formidable trade partner with Japan and should be treated as such.   
This paper will also be using the gravity model, which will involve a study focusing on 
the effects of the gravity model onto a country might be beneficial and its effect on the border 
effect (Okubo 2003, abstract).  His argument that Japan’s decreasing border effect spurs more 
trade with nearby countries is relevant to the thesis topic in that a higher degree of trade intensity 
between two countries (YA * YB) can create more exports for Japan (Okubo 2003, pg. 1).  Trade 
liberalization in Japan has led to a decrease in the border effect, allowing trade intensity to 
amplify (Okubo 2003, pg. 12). 
 In all, this thesis is unique in that it will include a variety of variables that will be 
analyzed to see if they have an effect on exports.  Focusing more on the outward FDI stock of 
Japan, this thesis is different from past ones by its being accompanied by other variables that 




rate will demonstrate its significance onto Japanese exports.  The relative exchange rate is a 
method to derive the exchange rate through a third currency, in this case, the US Dollar.  By 
looking at the growth rates of countries A and B, it would show a strong indication if it has any 
effect on the export levels of Japan.  Trade intensity is a fundamental part of the gravity theory.  
The gravity model was tested by Okubo (2003) and was found to have a positive relationship 
with higher trade based on the proximity between the trading nations.  FDI stock is the center 
piece of this thesis and will be analyzed empirically, in order to statistically prove that a higher 
outward FDI stock significantly creates more export opportunity for Japanese firms (Kimura 
2006). 
III. Methodology: 
XAB = f [e, gB, (YA * YB), FDIAB 
XAB = exports from country A to country B, e = real exchange rate, the denominator is Yen and 
the numerator is respective foreign currencies, gB = growth rate of country B (B = importing 
countries), YA = GDP of country A (or in this case Japan), YB = GDP of country B, FDIAB = 
outward FDI stock from country A to country B 
These variables were selected as a means of determining exports (X) over a given time period 
(1985-2005).  Variables such as GDP (Y) and X may relate to the real exchange rate (e) as 
determinants of a trade balance.  An inflated currency would promote more exports and 







This base empirical model showcases an outline as to how the variables are supposed to be 
presented in.  The beta value or α should designate the significance of its accompanying tested 
variable or V.  The model continues until Vx in order to fit all the variables being tested in this 
study.  The original empirical model (with rudimentary variables that do not correspond to any of 
the aforementioned variables belonging to this study) will be defined as: 
XAB = α0 + α1V1 + α2V2 + … + αxVx 
The countries that will be analyzed are the 10 nations of ASEAN, as well as Taiwan, 
South Korea and China.  I have also included China as a trade partner that Japan trades heavily 
with.  This study will also add each country’s GDP growth rate over the span of 1985-2005 as a 
variable, in the form of gB. 
The empirical base model with the tested variables being plugged into: 
XAB = α0 + α1(e) + α2(gB) + α3(YA*YB) + α4(FDIAB) 
This model is unique in that it focuses on FDI’s effect on Japan’s exports.  This study is 
seeking to find a relationship with XAB, due to the desire of this study to analyze the amount of 
exports leaving Japan (country A) and going to a country B.  Utilizing a software R and its 
capability to regress a certain variable with a host of others, this study will conduct such an 
analysis via OLS regression.  An OLS regression will give this study the evidence it needs to 
prove a variable has a significant impact or effect on the regressed variable.  Should the 
coefficient of a variable (or the beta value) be statistically greater than zero, this would verify 
that such a variable displays a significant influence onto the regressed variable.  Vice versa, a 
negative beta would imply that the variable does have adversary effect on the dependent variable 




By regressing the FDI variable with the export variable, this study is expected to find a 
positive correlation between the two.  Accompanying variables will be the relative exchange rate 
of the Japanese yen and the domestic currency of country B, which is derived from their 
respective exchange rates with the US Dollar, the growth rates of each trading partner nation and 
trade intensity between both countries (which is derived from YA * YB).  The size of each 
respective country’s GDP is crucial to understanding the value of the trade being associated 
between the two.  Trade is encouraged as a means of expanding a GDP. 
The purpose of the model is to isolate and scrutinize the FDI stock variable to see if it has 
any effect on the export variable.  In other words, it is being utilized to identify whether the FDI 
variable has significant effect on exports from the home country of Japan after the control 
variables.  When dealing with lagged effects, there exists the possibility for such due to it being a 
panel set data regression.  When dealing with a panel data regression spanning two decades, 
lagged effects may be responsible for a small but insignificant variation of the overall output. 
Variables e, gB, YA * YB and FDIAB are independent variables when variable XAB is the 
dependent.  This paper will argue that the increased outward stock of FDI will increase exports 
in Japan.  The growth rate variable will be vital to the model as they will show GDP growth rate 
across a 5 year average.  Variable YA*YB  is the associated variable that denotes the essential 
trade between Japan and a partner country in the form of a product of their two GDP’s.   
By taking into account the gravity model, it may be seen as to why ASEAN, Taiwan, 
South Korea and China were chosen as the trade partner nations.  They are the closest and offer 
the most trade value in comparison to other international countries.  This paper will use the 




translated as it being the overall trade between two countries.  A higher degree of trade would 
most likely mean a higher degree of exports leaving Japan and going into its trade partner nation. 
The names of the variables in the model that were created are strictly named by the 
author as references to a source of data and may be altered in whatever manner the reader may 
want to.  They are named in a manner reflecting their importance to the model.  “YA * YB” is the 
product of two GDP’s (country A being Japan’s GDP).  This is done to measure the magnitude of 
trade that would be happening between both Japan and a partner country B.  The magnitude of 
trade is important to this study as it ties in the GDP of two trading countries by generating a 
product of the two GDP values.  Quite simply, it reflects the degree of trade between two 
economies. “GDP_growth” is the growth rate of Japan and its partner country.  
“Relative_Exchange_Rate” is the relative exchange rate of the Japanese yen with the foreign 
currency in relation to the US Dollar.  In other words, the relative exchange rate (Bth/$)/(yen/$)  
can be described as the variable of the relation between the currencies of country B and Japan.   
  Bth   ÷   yen   →     Bth      𝑥   $      →      Bth     𝑥     $      →     Bth 
   $       $           $  yen          $             yen      yen 
 
 
The US Dollar aspect of this ratio would cancel out, leaving only the “currency of 
country B/yen” as the relative exchange rate.  “FDI_Stock” is the variable concerning the 
outward FDI stock Japan has invested in an applicable country.  “Regressed_Exports” hosts the 
variable that contains the amount of exports from Japan going into other partner countries in 







IV. Major Findings 
Due to the data being analyzed in a cross sectional manner, a pooling model would best suit this 
study.  This study utilizes two decades worth of information across multiple data points. 
Call: 
plm(formula = Regressed_Exports ~ Relative_Exchange_Rate  + GDP_growth + YA * YB  +   
FDI_Stock, data = mydata, model = "pooling") 
Balanced Panel: n = 13, T = 21, N = 294 
 
Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max 
-0.0411 -0.00864 -0.00374 0.00502 0.0609 
 
 Variable Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 7.61E-03 1.66E-03 4.5873 <0.001 
YA*YB 1.32E-26 7.01E-28 18.7907 <0.001 
GDP_growth 2.88E-04 1.90E-04 1.5188 0.1299 
Relative_Exchange_Rate -1.08E-04 2.38E-05 -4.5417 <0.001 
FDI_Stock 1.00E-04 1.59E-05 6.2911 <0.001 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    0.20431 
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.066812 
R-Squared:      0.67298 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.66846 





Table F: Mean of X & Y variables 
  X variable Y variables 
Relative Exports 0.021 - 
YA*YB  - 6.47E+23 
GDP Growth  - 5.34 
Relative Exchange Rate  - 21.567 
FDI Stock  - 109.4 
 
According to the output, a series of estimates, t-values and P-values were computed.  
With using the mean table as an inference, this study can judge how important a beta value is in 
relation to its original mean.  Having been listed with the Trade Intensity variable (YA * YB) first, 
this study will outline its findings in such a fashion, followed by the other variables.  The 
coefficient (beta) associated with such a variable resulted in a positive estimate for a change in 
exports (a value of 1.32e-26).  With a t-statistic of 18.79, it can be said that the estimate is larger 
than the standard error, simulating a positive correlation with the regressed variable.  In terms of 
the p-value, it is consequently smaller than 0.05, prescribing that this variable’s output is of 
significant value to this model. 
 Looking at the GDP growth variable, it may be inferred that its beta is positive and 
possesses the strongest estimate, in comparison to all the variables.  Although being of a lower t-
stat value at 1.52, it is still positive enough to justify a positive correlation with exports.  The 
unique component of this variable’s output is the p-value.  With a p-value of 0.13, this would 




insignificant.  This would mean that the GDP growth variable lacks strong enough evidence to 
prove its significance to the model.  
 Upon analyzing the Relative exchange rate variable, it can be seen that its beta is 
negative, posing as the single variable that contains such a negative estimate (-1.08e-04).  Due to 
its negative t-stat value, this would mean that the coefficient of the regression is less than the 
hypothesized value of such.  With a p-value of 8.2x10-7, which is smaller than the normal 
application of the 95% confidence level or 0.05 alpha level in regression statistics, it may suggest 
a significance into this model.  This would translate into the statement of the relative exchange 
rate variable holding a significant but also negative correlation with exports.   
 In regard to the FDI stock variable, its beta (1.00e-04) is positive enough to establish a 
positive correlation with the regressed variable.  With a substantial t-stat value of 6.29, this 
designates a precise measure in regard to the beta value.  With a high enough t-stat, the output 
given by this variable reflects a safe measure of computation when such a variable was regressed 
with exports. Its p-value is small enough to ensure that it falls into the 95% confidence interval, 
thereby solidifying its relevance to the model.  According to the output, FDI stock holds a 
significant and positive correlation with exports. 
Summary and Conclusion 
There is a qualification of this regression model; one problem is that OLS assumes the 
common intercept term in the regression model, but panel data cannot make that assumption.  
Upon relaxing the assumption through the implementation of a pooled model, it may be said that 
in such a model, a common series of cross sectional data utilizes a common intercept term.  All 
variables, with the exception of the relative exchange rate, appear to hold a positive correlation 




said that the GDP growth variable was the only variable that failed such a test.  With a 0.13, it 
fell outside the typical alpha level of 0.05, rendering it useless to the model.  
In conclusion, the work done in this study closes with the presentation that outward FDI 
stock flows, along with other variables such as GDP growth and trade intensity and hold a 
positive relationship with the export levels of Japan.  This study must also note that the GDP 
growth of Japan’s partner nations does not possess a relevance to the model that was created, 
however this must be taken with a grain of salt.  Even though its p value is high, its positive beta 
value should withhold some value in this study.  This study feels confident in saying that if the 
assumptions were relaxed, the GDP growth variable would prove to have greater relevance to the 
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